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Abstract: This paper argues that Bernard Williams’ Critical Theory Principle (CTP) is 
in tension with his realist commitments, i.e. deriving political norms from practices 
that are inherent to political life. The Williamsian theory of legitimate state power 
is based on the central importance of the distinction between political rule and 
domination. Further, he supplements the normative force of his theory with the 
CTP, i.e. the principle that acceptance of a justification regarding power relations 
ought not to be created by the very same coercive power. Williams frames this 
requirement as a method of identifying “subtle forms of coercion” that would make 
domination possible even when subjects are not aware of their true conditions. 
However, I contend that the CTP is an epistemic criterion of reflective 
(un)acceptability which is not strictly connected to the question of whether people 
are dominated or not. I show that there are cases of non-domination that fail the 
epistemic requirements of the CTP. 
 





 Political realism is the methodological view that political philosophy should not be 
treated as a branch of moral philosophy. Following this, realists contend that there 
are political norms that are not reducible to moral principles. The realist 
desideratum requires that political norms are derived from the constitutive features 
of politics and a given political context rather than universal moral presuppositions. 
However, the normative force of political realism remains a broadly debated subject 
(Hall 2015b; Sleat 2016; Prinz and Rossi 2017). The question at hand is how to 
reconcile a non-moralist understanding of politics with a sufficiently normative 
outlook providing practical orientation. Bernard Williams presents a particular 
strategy to strike a balance between the prescriptive capacity of political philosophy 
and his fidelity to what he takes as facts about politics. Williams constructs the 
Critical Theory Principle (CTP) to identify the cases in which subjects’ acceptance 
of a power holder’s justification is caused by the very same power relations (i.e. 
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self-justification of power). By the CTP, Williams aims to address issues such as 
indoctrination or implicit threats where power dynamics are not easily detectable. 
This seems to be a normative move that is not reducible to a morality prior to 
politics. The CTP ostensibly distinguishes genuine acceptance of a justification 
from subtle forms of coercion/domination without appealing to moral standards 
external to the given political context (Williams 2005). Provided that such a 
criterion is adopted, Williams assumes that the realist desideratum is met. In this 
paper, I aim to show that the CTP is incompatible with Williams’ realist 
commitments, at least within the context of state power. Specifically, in his theory 
of state legitimacy, the CTP conflicts with Williams’ political rule-domination 
distinction since it incorrectly defines certain relations of power as instances of state 
domination. For this reason, even if the CTP is not reducible to pre-political moral 
considerations, it is not suitable for a realist theory of legitimacy. 
 
 My initial claim is that the CTP is an epistemic criterion. It disqualifies every 
instance of self-justification of power due to the apparent circularity problem in 
such justifications. This is an epistemic deficiency that ought to be eliminated in a 
proper deliberative process. According to the CTP, a given justification by a power 
holder is genuinely accepted insofar as the acceptance itself is not solely created by 
the same coercive power, e.g. indoctrination via compulsory schooling. This is an 
epistemic criterion in the sense that it specifies the kind of cognitive procedure that 
the addressees of a justification ought to avoid in their belief-formation processes.  
 
 I then argue that employment of the CTP cannot be sustained if one adopts 
Williams’ realist commitments, i.e. his conceptual claims centred on the political 
rule-domination distinction. This is because the CTP is not capable of correctly 
tracking raw domination, i.e. a form of rule in which acceptance of a legitimizing 
narrative relies on rulers’ coercive power over those who accept the narrative. 
There might be non-coercive by-products of coercive state power which make 
individuals accept the justification of the state. In other words, not every instance 
of self-justification of power falls under the category of raw domination while the 
CTP categorically disqualifies self-justification of power on epistemic-deliberative 
grounds. By drawing on the social identity literature in psychology, I argue that 
individuals might accept the justification offered by power holders since the 
exercise of power constitutes an essential dimension of their social identity. In such 
situations, their acceptance would collapse into self-justification of power, which is 
not allowed by the CTP. However, I contend that following the CTP is problematic 
in cases like this because the influence of social identities on individuals’ psychology 
does not seem to be an instance of coercion. This influence is rather a non-coercive 
by-product of coercive state power. It is not an instance of domination because 
coercive power is not exercised over those who are influenced by the by-products. 
I therefore argue that the CTP should be revised in a way that exclusively filters out 
instances of domination, including reliance on subtle forms of coercion. 
 
 This paper invites readers to rethink how realist political philosophy should treat 
different sources of normativity, e.g. epistemic or moral. Epistemic forms of 
ideology critique, inspired by the Frankfurt School, are certainly valuable. However, 
basing a theory of state legitimacy on reflective acceptability might be too much to 
ask of a minimalistic approach that relies on the conceptual distinction between 
political rule and mere state coercion. This could overload the concept of state 




as justice of the state or legitimacy of the entire social order (Horton 2012). I believe 
it is beneficial for realism as a research program to keep the theory of state 
legitimacy minimalistic in terms of how normatively demanding it is. By doing so, 
it is possible to create the necessary space to formulate more demanding political 
values. 
 
 The paper proceeds as follows: I briefly summarize Williams’ realist theory of state 
legitimacy in the first section. In the second section, I explain why the CTP 
constitutes an epistemic criterion. In the third section, I argue that the CTP is 
incompatible with Williams’ realist commitments by discussing an example in 
which the self-justification of power does not imply mere coercion and/or 
domination over subjects. In the fourth section, I briefly discuss a possible strategy 
to revise the CTP in a way that would not suffer the weaknesses I indicate. 
 
1. The Theory of Legitimacy in Bernard Williams’ Realism 
 
 Bernard Williams (2005: 3) identifies the first political question “as the securing of 
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation”. This question 
is the first political question because without order and cooperation in a society, 
there would not be a political life in which we could meaningfully discuss further 
political questions (Williams 2005: 3). 2  While Williams (2005: 3–4) holds that 
solving the first political question is a necessary condition for political life, he 
believes that it is not sufficient. A tyranny can “solve” the first political question, 
i.e. maintaining order and security, by terrorizing people, but rule through brute 
force or threat is no different than the initial problem politics aims to solve. 
Williams (2005: 3–4) thus makes a distinction between political power and brute 
force/credible threats. Williams formulates this distinction through his concept of 
the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD). Meeting the BLD is the requirement that 
a state provides an acceptable justification of its own power to each and every 
subject (Williams 2005: 4).  
 
 Moreover, the BLD is “inherent in there being such a thing as politics” (Williams 
2005: 5) because only an acceptable justification of power is able to distinguish 
political authority from credible threats based on brute-force (Hall 2015a: 467). In 
other words, he derives his notion of legitimacy from the alleged conceptual 
distinction between political rule (rule through justification) and warfare/tyranny 
(rule through brute force).3 I call this the political rule-domination distinction. The notion 
of legitimacy is inherent to political rule because, if power holders claim that their 
actions “transcend the conditions of warfare”, the state is supposed to provide a 
legitimation of its own power to the citizens (Williams 2005: 6). The power holders’ 
normative expectation for citizen compliance coupled with the citizens’ 
legitimation demand is different from warfare in which the use of brute force is 
central.  
 
 Note that Williams (2005: 5) uses the notion of “successful domination” as the 
opposite of political rule without explaining how this is different from mere 
 
2 See also Raekstad (2018) for the claim that state formation is not necessary to solve the 
First Political Question. 
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coercion. I take coercion as a relatively narrow category that contains acts of 
violence, credible threats and other ways of imposing prohibitively high costs on 
individuals. Given his example of tyrants dominating their subjects through 
terrorization, I believe that this notion of domination is quite close to my 
conception of rule through mere coercion. Nonetheless, Williams (2005) avoids 
giving a full definition of coercion. He further holds that broader understandings 
of coercion can be plausible in addition to the narrow conception that implies 
intentional “obstructive activities of others” (Williams 2005: 80). A broader 
conception of coercion would also include cases that are unintended consequences 
of institutions structurally limiting “the opportunities of some class of citizens” 
(Williams 2005: 91). I employ the narrow conception of coercion for now, but will 
later discuss the implications of adopting a broader conception.  
 
 Further, the conception of domination I work with is also determined by the scope 
of the theory of political legitimacy I focus on. Domination might have many 
forms, from direct interpersonal relations of power to impersonal domination in 
which social structures generate a particular type of unfreedom without a specific 
agent as the power holder. If one discusses the legitimacy of an entire social order, 
e.g. the basic structure of society, it seems plausible to hold that we need to take 
impersonal domination into account, e.g. domination generated by the market 
forces, social norms, cultural patterns, etc. (Postone 1996: 159). Along the lines of 
Williams’ (2005: 1–17) latest writings on political legitimacy, I restrain the scope of 
my argument to the legitimacy of state power. Rather than assessing the entire 
institutional architecture in a community, I discuss the ways state power is exercised 
over subjects. This certainly has an impact on what type of domination is relevant 
to my argument. Williams (2005: 6) depicts a picture of interpersonal, dyadic 
relation of power in his theory of legitimate state power: “A coerces B and claims 
that B would be wrong to fight back”. Here state power is an agent-centric 
phenomenon that relies on a direct relationship between two groups. There is a 
“discreet and intentional agent” who acts as a dominator (Rahman 2017: 7). There 
is a sense in which power holders intentionally exercise their power over subjects 
and explicitly claim that they are the rightful authority to do so. Therefore, I assume 
that any unjustified instance of such power, i.e. domination, will similarly be dyadic. 
Domination could be overt or subtle, i.e. violence or indoctrination. However, it 
should at least be traceable to power holders’ intentions to coerce their subjects, 
which indicates clear interpersonal relationships.4 
 
 In Truth and Truthfulness (Williams 2002: 225–232), the scope of the CTP seems 
much broader in that any self-justification of power might count as domination of 
some kind. Williams’ (2005: 1–17) later writings on political realism mainly attempt 
to build a theory of political legitimacy for the exercise of state power. The way he 
incorporates the CTP into his later writings is also connected with a theory of 
legitimate state power. The subject matter of this paper is similarly the political 
legitimacy of state power rather than legitimacy or justice of the entire social order, 
i.e. the basic structure of society. Therefore, I hold that any instance of domination 
 
4 Williams’ conception of domination is different from the republican conception. The 
mere existence of arbitrary power over a group of individuals is sufficient for the republican 
conception of domination, regardless of the actual exercise of power (Pettit 2000: 52). In 
contrast, Williams’ conception of domination seems to presuppose an actual exercise of 





that is relevant to the argument of this paper has a dyadic dimension. 
 
 The political rule-domination distinction is the core of Williams’ realist turn 
because this conceptual distinction establishes the link between normative outlook 
and claims regarding the nature of politics. If the constitutive features of politics 
are to play a central role in realist political philosophy, one needs to show a clear 
relationship between the essential characteristics of politics and the norms 
governing political practice. The political rule-domination distinction serves exactly 
this purpose. It shows why legitimation of power is essential in a properly political 
order.5 By doing so, the realist approach delivers a normative standpoint derived 
from political practice itself rather than the pre-political requirements of morality. 
 
 There are two factors necessary to determine what counts as “acceptable” 
solutions to the BLD; namely, context dependency and the critical theory principle. 
First, let us examine an acceptable solution being context-dependent (Bavister-
Gould 2013). Williams contends that a political justification is acceptable insofar as 
it makes sense (MS) in a specific cultural context (Williams 2005: 10–11). This implies 
the question of whether a given relation of power makes sense to individuals as an 
“authoritative order”, i.e. where the legitimation appeals to the norms and values 
of this community (Williams 2005: 11). To put it differently, Williams’ MS implies 
that state power is conceived “as a form of legitimate authority in relation to the 
beliefs of those who are subject to it” (Sleat 2014: 325). The acceptability of a 
justification is determined by whether the justification coheres with the value 
system of a particular society. There are various interpretations of what this could 
mean. While justifiability in terms of people’s beliefs is a common interpretation, 
Williams sometimes talks about acceptance of a justification rather than acceptability, 
connoting subjects’ actual pro-attitudes (Williams 2005: 6–7; Sleat 2013: 117).  
 
 The second acceptability criterion is what Williams (2005: 6) calls the Critical Theory 
Principle (CTP). According to the CTP, “the acceptance of a justification does not 
count if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive power”. For instance, if 
people accept a state justification only because the state brainwashed them through 
state-owned media and other instruments of indoctrination, Williams claims that 
these people are still dominated. Their alleged “acceptance” is merely an instance 
of ideological indoctrination (i.e. the unreasonable adoption of beliefs which are 
imposed by coercive institutional environments). In such cases of ideological 
delusion, the state relies on its coercive capacity to indoctrinate its subjects rather 
than on its abilities to justify its power by appealing to people’s values and 
preferences. Therefore, the justification of power is circular. The power holder, 
whose power is supposed to be justified, claims to justify herself by that very same 
power.  
 
 It is important to note that Williams’ characterization of coercive power is broader 
than the classical-intuitive definitions of coercion (Nozick 1997). As suggested 
above, for Williams, coercive power includes not only threats and/or acts of 
violence but also when a power structure (e.g. the state) shapes the beliefs of its 
 
5 Sleat (2013) argues that political relationships necessarily include a degree of successful 
domination. According to this, the political rule-domination distinction would seem 
untenable. However, Sleat’s criterion of legitimacy still requires avoiding mere successful 




subjects through means of indoctrination (Williams 2002). Nevertheless, the type 
of coercive power implied by the CTP might still be reconciled with narrower 
definitions of coercion. After all, imposing an institutional structure to shape 
individuals’ beliefs would require direct and physical instances of coercion at its 
very foundations. For instance, indoctrination via compulsory schooling would not 
be successful without credible threats by the state (e.g. forcibly removing children 
from their home) coercing parents to send their children to such schools.  
 
2. The CTP as an Epistemic Criterion 
 
 There seem to be two interpretations about what kind of principle the CTP is. The 
first interpretation is that the CTP does indeed imply a criterion that is improperly 
contaminated by moral considerations (Prinz and Rossi 2017). The second 
interpretation is that the CTP is some kind of epistemic requirement in line with 
Geuss’ characterization of critical theories (Rossi 2019). In his reconstruction of 
the Frankfurt School, Raymond Geuss (1981: 91) suggests that critical theories are 
epistemic in that normative beliefs and attitudes are evaluated on the basis of their 
cognitive merits. The currency of such evaluation is whether certain sets of beliefs 
and attitudes are “reflectively unacceptable” (Geuss 1981: 91). If agents’ beliefs and 
attitudes are not acceptable upon a proper process of reflection, it follows that they 
do not have genuine reasons to hold these beliefs and attitudes. On this view, 
normative critique cannot be based on moral foundations outside agents’ context-
dependent process of deliberation (Geuss 1996: 199), as what is problematic about 
beliefs is based on power-induced distortions in the process of reflection. The 
proponents of the latter interpretation contend that “the distinction between 
acceptable and unacceptable legitimation stories is not moral but epistemic: 
ideological legitimation stories just aren’t what they purport to be, so epistemic 
caution requires us to disregard them” (Rossi 2019: 5). 
 
 I will now argue that the CTP constitutes an epistemic criterion for two reasons. 
First, it specifies a certain type of normative belief-formation that is deemed 
improper or undesirable. The epistemic threshold employed by the CTP is negative 
(detecting epistemic deficiencies) rather than positive (specifying the ideal epistemic 
desideratum). The type of cognitive fallacy it aims to eliminate is epistemic 
circularities in relation to the legitimation of state power. Second, in the CTP the 
addressees of a justification are considered to be quasi-epistemic agents whose 
success is evaluated by their deliberative performance in belief-formation within 
the practical contexts of action. 
 
 According to the CTP, the acceptability of a justification is taken as the 
normatively positive property that successful legitimation stories have. As I 
discussed in the first section, there ought to be an acceptable justification of state 
power in Williams’ theory of legitimacy. However, the acceptability threshold 
requires more than subjects’ actual pro-attitudes toward the justification offered by 
the state. It seems that there are three elements that are indicative of a desirable 
relationship between a power holder and subjects: the subjects’ accepting that state 
is legitimate (actual pro-attitudes), their acceptance being justifiable in terms of the 
subjects’ beliefs, and some kind of warrant that subjects genuinely have reasons to 





 The first two elements are covered by Williams’ notion of MS: “What (most) MS 
to us is a structure of authority which we think we should accept” (Williams 2005: 
11). Given that Williams shows a link between making sense and our first-order 
normative preferences, it would be fair to say that acceptability and/or acceptance 
of a justification are somehow associated with subjects’ actual pro-attitudes. 
Further, the Williamsian conception of legitimacy requires that we do not take 
actual pro-attitudes as the sufficient condition of acceptability. The notion of MS 
goes beyond mere acceptance when it poses an interpretative task which focuses 
on the justifiability of actual pro-attitudes within the broader local belief system in 
a social context (Williams 2005: 11). However, the first and the second elements 
combined are also not sufficient for acceptability of a justification. In Truth and 
Truthfulness, Williams (2002: 227) explicitly contends that assessing the quality of a 
justification in terms of individuals’ current set of beliefs is inadequate as a proper 
test for normative validity. Hence, the third element becomes essential in 
determining if a justification of state power is sufficiently good. 
 
 How can it be warranted that subjects genuinely have reasons to accept a 
justification? This task requires a distinction between good and bad reasons to 
accept certain premises to be true. A sense of “(un)acceptability” is needed since 
acceptance and justifiability in terms of given beliefs are not adequate. The type of 
belief-formation that is to be avoided is specified in Williams’ following words: 
 
“… if one comes to know that the sole reason one accepts some moral claim 
is that somebody’s power has brought it about that one accepts it…, one will 
have no reason to go on accepting it” (Williams 2002: 231). 
 
 Only a certain type of normative belief-formation, that has not solely been brought 
about by somebody’s power, can genuinely legitimize normative claims about 
power relations. In other words, subjects have genuine reasons to accept a justification 
only if these reasons are not created by the state power which is supposed to be 
justified. The CTP determines the cognitive requirements of normative belief-
formation on which a practical judgment about state legitimacy can be based. 
 
 The cognitive error that the CTP eliminates is a subtype of an epistemic fallacy, 
which is circularity. Excluding power-induced endorsement from the domain of 
acceptability means avoiding a circular belief-formation process. In self-
justification of power, individuals accept that power holders are legitimate only 
because the latter trained (or indoctrinated) the former accordingly (Williams 2002: 
227–228). However, the reliability of power holders’ claims is not assessed by 
independent standards (Williams 2002: 228). One does not really know if power 
holders are in a good position to make those claims. Hence, accepting power 
holders to be reliable can only be “justified” by circularly assuming them to be 
reliable in the first place. This is extremely similar to how epistemologists define 
epistemic circularity: 
 
“Suppose I form a belief -either inferentially or noninferentially- in the 
trustworthiness of one of my belief sources, X. If, in the formation of that 
belief, I depend upon X, then that belief is infected with epistemic circularity” 
(Bergmann 2004: 710). 
 




the self-justification of power constitutes a circularity problem as described above. 
This is a form of epistemic circularity because individuals cannot appeal to 
independent standards of justification which are not derived from the 
presupposition that power-holders are reliable: 
 
“… the justice of the system, the authority of the instructors, and hence their 
own reasons for accepting the justice of the system all hang together. Suppose 
they now turn to asking whether they have any independent ways of assessing 
the instructors’ authority” (Williams 2002: 228) 
 
 The fact that their acceptance itself is created by coercive power is problematic 
insofar as it reveals agents’ cognitive shortcomings, i.e. them having no genuine 
reasons to accept the justification or trust the instructors. The real problem is 
caused by the lack of genuine reasons to accept the justification that are not 
contaminated by the problem of circularity. This is fundamentally a deliberative 
shortcoming in the belief-formation procedure. Put differently, what determines 
whether a reason is genuine or not is whether it constitutes epistemic circularity in 
the legitimation of state power. 
 
 Further, it is important to clarify that the CTP is not an overarching epistemic 
principle that eliminates all sorts of cognitive deficiencies. It filters out a specific kind 
of epistemic deficiency in the belief-formation process. Epistemic circularities in relation 
to state power are only a subset of possible epistemic deficiencies. Williams seems 
to be quite permissive when it comes to other types of failures of rationality. For 
instance, Williams (2002: 226) opposes the idea of employing a universalist 
conception of rationality to critique all sorts of beliefs that could be fallaciously 
generated by the contextual circumstances. 
 
 Secondly, the CTP implies an epistemic criterion in that it conceives the addressees 
of a justification as quasi-epistemic agents. Individuals are supposed to interact with 
a particular justification mainly through a deliberative process relying on reasons 
and the assessment of their current set of beliefs. This process is resonant of a 
cognitive procedure. According to Williams, acceptance of a justification ought to 
be a reasonable judgment that reflects a proper process of deliberation: 
 
"We need a schema by which we start with the people's current beliefs and 
imagine their going through a process of criticism, a process in which the [CTP] 
test plays a significant part. We can think of the disadvantaged as asking a 
series of reflective questions about their situation. Our picture of this will of 
course be artificial rationalization, but something like it does actually happen on 
a social scale" (Williams 2002: 227, italics added). 
 
 The objective of the CTP here is presented as providing a normative test that relies 
on a deliberative process. The addressees of a justification are hypothetically invited 
to undergo a process of criticism that concentrates on the quality of reasons they 
previously took for granted, i.e. reflective questions about their current beliefs. 
Following this, normative assessment becomes possible by rationally 
reconstructing agents’ faculty of judgment. This reconstruction points out the gap 
between what agents do indeed accept and what they are supposed to reject given 
the distinction between genuine and pseudo-reasons to form and/or affirm beliefs. 




abovementioned process focuses on eliminating and/or revising problematic 
normative beliefs. Williams’ process of criticism aims to disqualify a particular kind 
of bad “cognitive performance” in the process of belief- or acceptance-formation: 
the inability to distinguish genuine reasons from the mere effects of power (Turri 
2009). This is a matter of cognitive performance rather than volitional performance 
because the purpose of the test is to end up with reasonable beliefs rather than 
having the motivation to do the right thing. So, even if the agents hypothetically 
assess their normative beliefs in this process of criticism, what they are subject to 
is still a cognitive procedure. This perhaps could even be considered an 
epistemology of moral beliefs. The focus of the principle is the procedural quality 
of belief-formation rather than intrinsically moral properties of agents’ intentions. 
 
 One might contend that the link between denouncing self-legitimation of power 
and interpreting the CTP as an epistemic criterion is not obvious. Perhaps, one may 
argue, Williams’ approach is still a moral critique rather than an epistemic one since 
moral reasoning also works with notions such as rationality, reasons and 
justification. Although Williams (2002: 230) explicitly states that his critical method 
aims to provide “a theory of error” rather than that of moral truth, it is possible to 
define the CTP as a general principle of normativity which contains moral 
considerations. However, even when we agree that moral and epistemic 
considerations are highly intertwined with one another in the domain of practical 
reasoning, we have reasons to believe that epistemic critique is in some sense more 
fundamental for Williams. In his famous paper “Internal and External Reasons”, 
he explicitly designs the criterion for having a practical reason through a falsity-
aversive epistemic criterion (Williams 2001: 79). According to this, the prima facie 
practical reason to Φ is undermined only if either a false belief is the cause of the 
motivation to Φ or the agent’s belief “in the relevance of Φing to the satisfaction” 
of that motivation is false (Williams 2001: 79). Williams (2001: 79) explicitly 
suggests that an “epistemic consequence” follows from the failure of practical 
rationality, according to which an agent “may falsely believe an internal reason 
statement about himself.” In other words, poor deliberative performance leads to 
a cognitive error, which makes agents fallaciously believe that they have a practical 
reason to Φ. This is indeed what the CTP aims to show in the context of political 
life: avoiding those cases in which agents falsely believe that their state is legitimate. 
 
 Another objection to my epistemic reading would be to contend that epistemic 
deficiencies are problematic only because they, themselves, are instances of 
domination. Hence, it would not be plausible to conceptually isolate the epistemic 
requirement embedded in the CTP from the Williamsian distinction between 
political rule and domination. I agree that a violation of the CTP and domination 
often overlap. However, within a theory of legitimate state power, there is no such 
necessary link between reflective unacceptability and domination. This is because 
the type of domination imposed by state power is dyadic: one group exercising 
power and claiming authority over the other. There could be many other side 
effects of such power that promote epistemic circularities in the legitimation of 
state power without interpersonal, dyadic relations of domination. For instance, as 
I will discuss in the sections below, certain individuals’ deliberation can be distorted 







3. How the CTP Is Not Compatible with Williams’ Realist Commitments 
 
3.1 The CTP and The Realism Constraint 
 
 Even when one accepts that the CTP is an epistemic criterion, one still needs to 
specify what kind of epistemic criterion it is according to Williams. Is it a free-
standing epistemic requirement, merely checking the plausibility of subjects’ beliefs 
about a particular subject, or an epistemic criterion that reveals a political truth, 
such as discovering how people are actually treated? Adopting the first 
interpretation, one might contend that a subject forms unacceptable beliefs which 
do not meet some minimal standard of rationality without her necessarily being 
dominated by power holders. In contrast, the second type of epistemic assessment 
aims to construct the political rule-domination distinction as it focuses on the way 
people are treated, i.e. whether they are dominated. Before arguing that the CTP is 
not compatible with Williams’ realist commitments, let me explicate why it is 
appropriate to evaluate the CTP by the standards of the second interpretation 
rather than the first one. 
 
 One might argue that there is nothing wrong with the CTP being a free-standing 
epistemic principle whose normative authority is not derived from the notion of 
politics. Principles can be borrowed from either epistemic or moral domains, unless 
they undermine the realist outlook which focuses on the constitutive features of 
politics. As long as one respects the constraints of realism, anything goes. 6 
Following this line of reasoning, one would contend that it is not necessary for the 
CTP to be derived from the political rule-domination distinction or from similar 
considerations regarding the way people are treated by power holders. The CTP 
could be conceived as an additional criterion which is different from Williams’ 
requirement of non-domination. Consequently, one would hold that a violation of 
the CTP is not necessarily an indicator of raw domination. Instead, additional to 
the political rule-domination distinction, it might function as a secondary criterion 
of acceptability. 
 
 I will respond to this objection in two steps. First, Williams himself defines “targets 
of the critical theory principle” as “accepted social and institutional understandings 
which increasingly come to appear … as more subtle forms of coercion” (Williams 
2005: 14). According to Williams, although self-justification of power prima facie 
looks like the acceptance of certain beliefs based on individuals’ reasons, the CTP 
functions to identify “subtle forms of coercion” which are employed to influence 
these individuals’ beliefs. This principle investigates the role of coercion in 
maintaining power relations. Hence, the task of the CTP (i.e. identifying reliance 
on subtle forms of coercion) seems to be inherent in making the political rule-
domination distinction. This is at least what Williams intends to achieve when he 
employs the principle in the context of his theory of legitimacy. 
 
 In addition to the textual evidence from Williams’ writings, there is a more 
theoretical reason why the CTP should not be interpreted as a free-standing 
epistemic principle. Employing the CTP as a purely epistemic criterion would 
replace the question “how are political agents treated?” with the question “are 
political agents’ beliefs warranted?” This is because epistemic principles 
 




concentrate on agents’ evidential considerations. When the CTP is interpreted in 
purely epistemic terms (i.e. without expecting its violation to be an instance of 
domination), what matters is whether subjects have genuine reasons to form a 
particular judgment. Conversely, the first question seems to be more suitable for a 
political enquiry in that it pertains to authority and power relations in a society. 
People are always “treated” in a particular way within a political context where 
conflict and collective action are ineliminable (Mouffe 2005; Krause 2012). These 
are the fundamental dimensions of a realist conception of politics (Sleat 2016: 255). 
 
 One might contend that we can employ both questions; using the CTP as a purely 
epistemic criterion would allegedly not create a conflict between these two 
questions. However, once the conceptual link between the epistemic and 
treatment-related (e.g. non-domination) requirements is broken, there are 
possibilities in which certain relations of power meet treatment-related criteria 
while failing epistemic criteria. Such cases would lead to the controversial 
conclusion that there is an illegitimate polity with subjects who are not dominated 
by the power holders. This kind of unrestrained influence of epistemic 
requirements would be controversial for realists because epistemic deficiencies 
seem to be another constitutive feature of politics. Without knowing how to limit 
epistemic requirements from within politics, free-standing epistemic criteria may 
easily collapse into an unrealistic conception of politics. This would count against 
the realists’ commitment to accurately portray facts about politics. In what follows, 
I explain why epistemic deficiencies are a constitutive feature of politics. 
 
 As Mouffe argues, one reason why epistemic deficiencies are a constitutive feature 
of politics is that affective attitudes are essential for a proper conception of “the 
political” (Mouffe 2000: 24; Mihai 2014: 32). According to Mouffe (2000: 24), the 
emergence of collective identities in political life entails that individuals are sensitive 
to the affective attitudes that are linked with the conflicting distinction between 
“us” and “them”. Insofar as the conflictual nature of political life fosters hegemonic 
power struggles among competing social groups, political passions, stemming from 
the existence of rival collective identities, are significantly relevant to making sense 
of political action (Mihai 2014: 33). The influence of passions and other sorts of 
affective attitudes on belief-formation processes is undesirable from an epistemic 
point of view as these attitudes promote cognitive biases (Kahan 2013). 
Furthermore, time constraints inherently play a significant role in politics, curbing 
political agents’ epistemic capabilities. The problem is that political actions are 
always taken under time constraints (Zohlnhöfer and Rüb 2016: 3). Even if one 
assumes that there are universal and knowable truths, there is simply not enough 
time to converge towards those truths within a predefined time frame. 
 
 Considering that serious epistemic deficiencies are an ineliminable aspect of 
politics, the proper realist strategy would be to contextualize epistemic 
requirements. By this, one can make epistemic requirements harmonious with the 
realities of political life. However, there seems to be more than one 
contextualization strategy. One can opt for immanent critique which criticize all 
sorts of political beliefs by the local epistemic standards of the community. 
Alternatively, one can decide to employ a less demanding epistemic criterion that 
only rules out instances of epistemic circularities. This would make the epistemic 
inquiry more responsive to contextual circumstances such as the current set of 




exclusively focuses on epistemic circularities in relation to the justification of state 
power. All these three options are different ways to contextualize epistemic values 
under imperfect circumstances. However, there seems to be no non-arbitrary 
explanation of why we should prefer one of these options to others. Realism as a 
general approach to political philosophy does not specify what degree of 
contextualization we need to adopt. For this reason, Williams’ interest in building 
a context-dependent political philosophy is not a sufficient explanation of why he 
specifically focuses on a particular subset of epistemic deficiencies. The first 
interpretation of the CTP is therefore at an impasse. 
 
 In contrast, Williams’ choice makes sense when we adopt the second 
interpretation, i.e. the CTP as an epistemic principle revealing treatment-related 
truths.7 If the task of epistemic requirements is defined as detecting whether state 
power dominates subjects, then exclusively focusing on epistemic circularities in 
relation to the justification of state power seems to have a plausible rationale. 
According to this, the lack of genuine reasons to accept a justification would be 
considered as domination because the agents’ epistemic shortcomings would 
overlap with the causal influence of state power on their prima facie acceptance. In 
other words, as the exclusive causal role of state power can be singled out in the 
formation of acceptance, the CTP would be the proper way to contextualize 
epistemic requirements, identifying how individuals are situated vis-à-vis state 
power. Hence, the second interpretation explains why Williams opts for the CTP 
rather than other contextualized epistemic principles. Williams is interested in this 
kind of epistemic requirement because he believes that it says something important 
about the practical relationship between state power and subjects. Within the 
context of the Basic Legitimation Demand, the CTP as an epistemic requirement is 
constrained within politics since its only function is to elicit the political truth 
regarding how subjects are treated by their state, whether it be genuine legitimation 
or domination. Given this interpretation, I believe that it is legitimate to assess the 
CTP by checking if it is genuinely capable of tracking instances of domination. 
After all, it is the task of this principle to identify power holders who rely on “subtle 
forms of coercion”. Adopting the second interpretation by no means implies that 
the CTP is a genuine principle of non-domination. This is because the link between 
this particular type of epistemic circularity and domination is far from obvious. The 
second interpretation only presents two important insights. First, it helps us 
understand the intended function of the CTP in the broader system of Williams’ 
theory of legitimacy. Second, it gives us a yardstick that can be used to assess the 
CTP and decide if it is able to deliver on its promises, i.e. successfully revealing 
truths about domination. 
 
3.2 A Violation of the CTP Does Not Necessarily Imply Raw Domination 
 
 After establishing the link between the CTP as an epistemic criterion and its task 
to correctly identify subtle forms of domination, I will now contend that this 
principle is not capable of fulfilling its task, at least in its current form. This is 
because there are cases in which the CTP falsely categorizes certain relations of 
power as instances of domination. Relying on social identity theory in psychology, 
I contend that certain instances of self-justification of power (violations of the 
 
7  As I already suggested, treatment-related questions ask how subjects are treated, 




CTP) do not necessarily lead to domination as the subjects’ acceptance of the 
justification might be produced by non-coercive by-products of state power. These 
are cases in which subjects and power holders share a particular type of social 
identity because of the way power is exercised over the third parties. In this way, if 
subjects accept the power holders’ justification only because of their shared 
identity, this would be a plain cognitive bias or epistemic incompetence rather than 
a subtle form of coercion.8 
 
 Let me first give a concise outline of social identity theory. Social psychologists 
working on this theory contend that there are two important factors in explaining 
human behaviour: interpersonal and intergroup dynamics (Tajfel and Turner 1979 
34). Interpersonal behaviour as an analytic category focuses on “interactions 
between two or more individuals that are fully determined by their interpersonal 
relationships and individual characteristics” (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 34). 
Conversely, intergroup behaviour refers to interactions “which are fully determined 
by their respective memberships in various social groups or categories…” (Tajfel 
and Turner 1979: 34). Of course, these two are ideal types. Human behaviour is 
usually a mixture of interpersonal and intergroup factors in reality.  
 
 The second important aspect of social identity theory is the claim that intergroup 
behaviour is largely explained by the influence of individuals’ social identity rather 
than by conflicts of interest or the incongruence of beliefs among social groups. 
“Even when there is no explicit or institutionalized conflict or competition between 
groups, there is a tendency toward ingroup-favouring behaviour” (Tajfel 1982: 24). 
Social identity theorists argue that ingroup favouritism and discrimination against 
outsiders are produced largely by individuals’ intrinsic motivation to “protect, 
enhance, preserve, or achieve a positive social identity for members of the group” 
(Tajfel 1982: 24). According to Tajfel (1981: 255), social identity is “that part of the 
individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership 
of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of 
that membership.” Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that even minimal social 
categorization is sufficient to instigate ingroup favouritism and discriminatory 
behaviour towards outsiders (Billig and Tajfel 1973). Lastly, it is known that the 
intrinsic motivation to protect and enhance one’s social identity also generates 
cognitive biases (Cohen 2003; Sherman and Cohen 2006; Kahan 2013). Hence, the 
emotional commitments individuals have in relation to their social group not only 
influence the way they treat other individuals but also distort the way they form 
their own beliefs. 
 
 Drawing on the insights of social identity theory, I contend that self-justification 
of power without domination is possible. Consider the following example: some 
individuals in a community, call them the insiders, have a strong belief that their 
ruler’s justification of her power is acceptable. This justification is also coherent 
with the insiders’ current set of beliefs. Their acceptance is, however, a product of 
an emotion-led bias. The insiders and the ruler share a particular type of social 
identity. They hold an affective connection with the ruler. As an extension of their 
 
8  Finlayson (2018: 791) contends that the heavy emphasis on cognitive biases is 
problematic since it functions as an individualist narrative, overshadowing how ideologies 
function within social structures. In contrast, the type of bias I discuss is caused by the 




ingroup favouritism, insiders suffer from a cognitive bias that leads them to accept 
the justification in question. Moreover, imagine that their shared social identity is 
established by the ruler’s exercise of power. For instance, the ruler has constructed 
this emotional connectedness by discriminating against another group, the 
outsiders. This discriminatory treatment constructed and affirmed the insiders’ 
social identity in relation to the outsiders.  Given the findings of social identity 
theory suggesting that even minimal social categorization is sufficient for 
intergroup dynamics to emerge, the exercise of state power would be quite an 
influential way to initiate such a process. There are many ways state power can be 
used to influence social groupings: the distribution of economic advantages and/or 
burdens, changing the way diverse social groups are supposed to interact with each 
other (e.g. interactions between workers and employers through labour law), 
overemphasizing the inter-group cultural differences in policy-making, etc.9 These 
instances are conducive to creating new types of social categorizations or deepening 
the existing ones. Hence, the way state power is exercised might lead to the 
emergence of new identities or increase the perceived importance of pre-existing 
social identities. This may be to the extent that individuals’ psychological 
propensities are significantly influenced.10 
 
 In such a setting, it would clearly violate the CTP if insiders accept the justification 
of the power holder only because of their shared social identity, which is in and of 
itself constructed by the way state power is exercised. From an epistemic point of 
view, the way subjects form their beliefs regarding the acceptability of the 
justification is certainly unhealthy. The cognitive procedure through which subjects 
accept the relevant justification does not meet the requirements of “not-too-bad-
evidence”. This is because their acceptance would be caused solely by “the effects 
of power”, which are supposed to be filtered out by the CTP (Williams 2002: 226). 
Power-induced emotional attitudes cause subjects to accept the claims of power 
holders while their bias-free reasoning would not to accept the same justification. 
This is the sort of epistemic circularity which the CTP intends to avoid. The 
reliability of power holders’ claims are not ratified by the independent standards 
which are irreducible to the psychological influence created by the same power. 
 
 However, as a realist test, the CTP should be able to identify this case as an instance 
of domination due to the reasons I previously detailed. I argue that this example 
does not count as an instance of domination, reliance on some form of mere 
coercion. My claim relies on the distinction between being influenced by coercive power 
and being coerced by coercive power. I believe that this conceptual distinction is 
normatively significant because only the latter implies that coercive power is 
exercised over an individual in a meaningful way. For instance, imagine three actors: 
a police officer, an aggressor and an ordinary citizen. If the officer arrests the 
aggressor despite the latter’s resistance, it seems plausible to believe that the 
aggressor is in some way coerced. Moreover, we can say that the ordinary citizen is 
influenced by this exercise of coercive power. Knowing that the aggressor has been 
detained, the ordinary citizen is relieved and changes her daily habits. For instance, 
she does not mind going out later at night as she predicts that the likelihood of 
 
9 See (LeBas 2006) for a discussion on how politicians’ way of conducting politics triggers 
increasing polarization in the process of identity-formation. 
10 See (Cinnirella 1997) for the relevance of social identity framework for large groups 




being assaulted is now much lower. Further, the ordinary citizen may even develop 
irrational attitudes such as being careless about her safety, underestimating other 
possible sources of danger. Nonetheless, even though the ordinary citizen is 
influenced by the exercise of the officer’s coercive power, it would be implausible 
to say that she is coerced by the very same power. Even if this power causes her to 
form epistemically unwarranted beliefs (underestimating other sources of danger), 
this does not mean that she is under the domination of the police officer. In this 
sense, I hold that there are non-coercive by-products of coercive power when that 
power is exercised in a relatively complex social environment with more than two 
agents or groups. Coercion over one group might have non-coercive by-products 
influencing another group. 
 
 Similarly, I believe that the subjects’ acceptance of the justification due to the 
power-induced social identity is a non-coercive by-product of coercive power. It is 
undoubtable that subjects are drastically influenced by the exercise of power. 
However, this power seems to mainly be exercised over outsiders rather than 
insiders. The former is the group whose members are discriminated via various 
forms of state power. Coercion implies “obstructive activities of other people” 
which leads to the loss of certain capacities in the coercee (Williams 2005: 80). If 
we say that coercive power is used to discriminate against outsiders, it makes sense 
to believe that power holders obstruct certain ways outsiders might act while the 
same impediments are not in place for insiders. This is how the relational logic of 
discrimination works. No treatment can be at once universal and discriminatory. A 
policy is discriminatory when there is another group who does not suffer from the 
same type of obstructions reducing their capacities. Following this, we have reasons 
to accept that the way insiders are influenced by state power does not imply an 
instance of coercion over them. This is because the influence on them is caused by 
the fact that another group is coerced in a way that they themselves do not 
experience. 
 
 One might contend that insiders’ not being coerced in a particular way does not 
mean that they are not coerced at all. An exercise of state power might have two 
different coercive outputs. The first output would be to coerce outsiders in the 
narrow sense of the term “coercion” while the second output would be to coerce 
insiders in the broader sense of the term. Let me restate what I mean by the broad 
and narrow conceptions of “coercion”. The difference is about what counts as 
coercive restrictions and/or how to specify the nature of the impairment resulting 
from an instance of coercion. The narrow conception of coercion relies on 
intentionally employed restraints such as brute force, threats, and fear-inducing 
activities which aim to pressure the coercee’s faculty of judgment. Conversely, the 
broad conception of coercion also covers restraints that are the by-products of 
social institutions unintentionally depriving the coercee of certain capacities 
(Williams 2005: 80). Another possible way to draw a distinction between the narrow 
and broad sense is to focus on the object of deprivation. For instance, as the narrow 
conception of coercion is based on means of prevention (e.g. threat or violence) 
which generate a feeling of compulsion in the coercee’s psychology, the object of 
deprivation is usually taken to be associated with the coercee’s actual wants, i.e. 
preventing someone from doing what she actually desires to do. In contrast, the 
broad conception of coercion would also involve certain important capacities as a 
relevant object of deprivation even when the agent is not aware of her condition, 




her “from hearing of other options” (Williams 2005: 82). 
 
 Adopting a broader conception of coercion, one might object to my argument by 
saying that insiders are coerced in this sense of the term. First, one would argue 
that unintended by-products of coercive power can also be deemed coercive since 
such by-products might “structurally limit the opportunities of some class of 
citizens” (Williams 2005: 91). Even if such an instance of power is not dyadic in 
the strict sense of the term, it still has a relational dimension. This is because the 
exercise of state power pertains to a distributive imbalance between advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups, which are interpersonal relations. In other words, even if 
insiders are not directly coerced, they could still be deprived of certain important 
capacities in relation to power holders due to indirect products of the exercise of 
power. 
 
 Secondly, the objector would need to identify the resource or capacity that the 
insiders are deprived of. This is because an instance of structural domination 
requires a type of resource or capacity loss that makes agents suffer a particular 
kind of unfreedom (Cudd 1994: 25). The most plausible object of deprivation 
seems to be tied to insiders’ cognitive capacities since a type of cognitive bias 
engenders their acceptance of power holders’ justification. The objector would then 
contend that insiders are deprived of an unbiased cognitive perspective as a result 
of the exercise of power. As social psychological evidence shows, the influence of 
social identities curb individuals’ cognitive capabilities (Kahan 2013). Assuming 
that cognitive ability to form unbiased judgments is valuable and an essential 
capacity for individuals, the objector would hold that even insiders are dominated 
in the political order presented here. They are as dominated as any other social 
group which is structurally oppressed through the unintended consequences of 
social institutions depriving them of certain important capacities. Insiders’ capacity 
to form sound judgments via a healthy cognitive procedure is taken away by the 
exercise of power. As a result, the objector would conclude that both insiders and 
outsiders are dominated in this order, albeit through different types of coercion 
which are generated by the same instance of state power. Hence, self-justification 
of power would again collapse into an order of domination.11 
 
 Let me now show why this objection fails. In relationships of domination, there 
has to be a distributive imbalance between the dominant and the dominated 
regarding the object of deprivation.12 For instance, when we talk about patriarchal 
domination, we often refer to how women are systematically deprived of certain 
capacities in relation to men. In the case of indoctrination as “preventing 
individuals from hearing about other options”, the indoctrinator has a privileged 
access to sources of knowledge while the indoctrinated is deprived of these same 
resources. Williams (2005: 91) also emphasizes the relational nature of structural 
coercive restraints when he defines them as “arrangements which structurally limit 
the opportunities of some class of citizens…” Deprivation of certain capacities is 
 
11 Certain continental philosophers conceptualize the constitutive influence of power 
upon the formation of individuals’ identities as “subjectivation” (Foucault 1982). I am not 
denying that such instances of identity-making can be problematic. However, what I am 
interested in here is whether subjectivation constitutes the appropriate kind of power 
dynamic which can be criticized within a theory of state legitimacy. 
12 Cudd (1994: 25) makes a similar point in that the harms which the oppressed people 




rooted in a social context where a subset of citizens suffers from this lack. This is 
how one can distinguish deprivation as a political notion from sheer lack of 
something. Deprivation as a political notion implies a relational phenomenon. 
 
 However, there may not be a similar distributive imbalance regarding our object 
of deprivation (unbiased cognitive perspective) between the power holder and 
insiders. As previously discussed, both the power holder and insiders share the 
same type of social identity. There seems to be no reason to assume that power 
holders are somehow immune to the laws of psychology and have privileged access 
to a cognitively superior perspective. In cases of manipulation and/or 
indoctrination, it makes sense to think that there is such a distributive imbalance 
because power holders know what they hide from their subjects. So, in these cases, 
subjects are deprived of information in relation to power holders. However, when 
it comes to the effects of social identities upon individuals, it seems sensible to 
believe that power holders’ cognitive capabilities are at least similarly distorted. Of 
course, there might be some power holders who are more rational but still act as 
biased partisans due to strategic considerations. Nonetheless, in that case, the 
exclusive causal relationship between social identity and acceptance of the 
justification would be broken. Manipulation would be a second factor explaining 
why insiders accept the justification of power holders. 
 
 In Truth and Truthfulness, Williams (2002: 222) holds that there could be potential 
cases “in which the advantaged and the disadvantaged parties both accept the 
[legitimation] story.” Put differently, a violation of the CTP that leads both the ruler 
and insiders to lack an unbiased cognitive perspective might count as domination. 
However, there are two possible scenarios under these circumstances: a) rulers are 
similarly influenced by their own means of indoctrination, with their power being 
exercised over insiders; and b) both rulers and insiders are ideologically deluded by 
the effects of power exercised over third parties. The first scenario does not pose 
a challenge to my point as there is a dyadic power relation between rulers and 
insiders in the first place. However, in the second scenario, it is not clear how such 
an instance of domination can meaningfully be conceived as dyadic, which is 
needed for a theory of legitimate state power. First, the power in question is not 
directly exercised over insiders. So it is not dyadic in the strict sense of the term. 
Further, if there is no distributive imbalance of any kind, e.g. relative deprivation 
of insiders in comparison to rulers, there seems to be no genuine interpersonal 
relationship at stake. Why not call this an instance of impersonal domination where 
both rulers and insiders are dominated due to non-agential social forces? It is true 
that the effect of power is traceable to power holders’ coercion over third parties. 
However, the way both they and insiders suffer from ideological distortion pertains 
to the broader cultural environment in which social identities, norms and shared 
beliefs play a key role in the self-oppression of the community. Although it says 
something important about the legitimacy of a social order as a whole, this is very 
different from the legitimacy of dyadic power relations in a theory of state power. 
 
 Consequently, I believe that it is not plausible to regard power-induced creation of 
social identities as a broader form of coercion. The influence of social identities is 
different from indoctrination and manipulation in the sense that even power 
holders might suffer from the same kind of cognitive biases. So, it is not necessary 
that there is a distributive imbalance regarding the object of deprivation. Following 




of domination. There could be non-coercive by-products of coercive state power, 
which might make some individuals accept the justification of power holders. 
Therefore, the CTP is not able to correctly track political domination. 
 
 One might ask “what about the outsiders who are coerced?” Is legitimacy a 
normative property only in relation to those who accept the legitimation story? 
Williams seems to believe that an acceptable legitimation should be offered to each 
subject, not only a subset of them. First, the fact that insiders accept the justification 
of state power due to coercion over outsiders does not say anything about how 
outsiders normatively relate to the same state. It could be that outsiders accept the 
justification offered by power holders for some other reason. There might be two 
parallel legitimation processes. Even if it is not the ideally just state for the 
outsiders, they can still think that it is minimally legitimate due to certain benefits 
associated with the regime such as a degree of security and economic prosperity 
etc. Second, relying on Williams’ (2005: 10) contention that legitimacy is a non-
binary property, one can bite the bullet and say that legitimacy is always realised 
“with respect to those to whom the order can be legitimated” (Hall 2015a: 473). Of 
course, this would imply that outsiders are being subordinated. However, there is 
still a sense in which such a political system is partially legitimate. 
 
4. How to Revise the CTP 
 
 I am not able to present a full-fledged account of how the CTP should be revised 
due to space constraints. Nonetheless, I offer a possible reformulation of the CTP 
and expound some of the basic desiderata that the revised version needs to satisfy. 
It is important to note that my revision aims to improve the CTP in a direction that 
Williams would approve. Hence, it is a kind of modification of the original principle 
rather than a complete replacement. Given that the inadequacy of the CTP is 
caused by its inability to distinguish non-coercive by-products of power from 
coercion, the revised version should be able to identify when the influence of 
coercive power implies coercion over the influencee. One possible formulation 
could be the following: 
 
CTP`: The acceptance of a justification of power does not count (i) if 
acceptance is solely created by the very same power and (ii) if the power is 
directly or indirectly exercised over the addressees of the justification whose acceptance 
is at stake. 
 
 By adding the second condition, one would implicitly draw the important 
distinction between being influenced by coercive power and being coerced by 
coercive power. Individuals can still be influenced by coercive power that is 
exercised over others. However, if we cannot explain how this instance of power 
is also exercised over the individuals in question, then it is not clear how they are 
coerced or dominated. When one is not able to present a plausible causal story 
regarding how they are coerced, it seems that their acceptance is caused by a non-
coercive by-product of power. By filtering out potential cases like this, the revised 
version of the CTP (CTP`) would provide a sound epistemic criterion which 
correctly identifies instances of domination, namely, political orders based on mere 
coercion over those whose acceptance is at stake. 
 




should rule out indoctrination through disciplinary state institutions. Although 
indoctrination is often thought to be a form of soft power, disciplinary institutions 
fundamentally rely on some narrow sense of coercion. For instance, indoctrination 
of a group of people via compulsory schooling usually requires some sort of threat 
or physical force to keep the indoctrinated within the institutional setting until 
indoctrination has become successful. Hence, indoctrination through these 
institutions is more than a non-coercive by-product of power. Second, the CTP` 
should exclude products of coercive power that can be used to manipulate others. 
For instance, if individuals’ acceptance solely relies on power holders’ preventing 
them from having undistorted information regarding certain important issues, then 
ordinary individuals are limited in their opportunities in relation to power holders. 
This is because power holders would have privileged access to sources of 
information while others are deprived of the capacities linked with having complete 
information. On the other hand, they are not directly coerced in the narrow sense 
of the term. This relationship resembles the broad conception of coercion I 
previously discussed since the manipulated subjects are deprived of the capacity of 
informed decision-making as a result of the exercise of coercive power. Considering 
the asymmetry of information, power holders have the manipulative means to limit 
others’ freedom to form an opinion. To be able to incorporate broader conceptions 
of coercion into my account, I assume that the CTP` should also account for the 
illegitimacy of such cases. 
 
 I believe that the CTP` is indeed a good candidate to satisfy these two desiderata. 
The first desideratum refers to the cases where disciplinary institutions such as 
compulsory schooling rely on direct forms of coercion. For instance, the state often 
threatens to take away a child from her parents if they do not send her to school. 
Alternatively, the child is disciplined via threats and even physical impediments (e.g. 
walls of a boarding school, several ways to punish students, etc.) in the school 
before she is fully indoctrinated, i.e. accepting the justification. Since these instances 
show how coercive power is exercised over the addressee of a justification, the 
CTP` would rule them out through its second condition. 
 
 The second desideratum would also be satisfied because the CTP` excludes the 
ways coercive power is indirectly exercised over the addressees of a justification. 
 Here, there is an act of coercion, C, which intimidates alternative media outlets 
and enforces a policy of censorship. Moreover, there is a product of C, call this P, 
which gives the state special powers to manipulate other individuals due to 
asymmetric information. P would certainly limit the available options for the 
manipulated individuals, hence imposing a type of unfreedom, because they do not 
have access to undistorted information. I believe that P alone would count as an 
instance of domination through indirect coercion over the addressees of the 
justification whose acceptance is at stake. First, the manipulated individuals are 
deprived of certain capacities in relation to power holders. Hence, unlike the case 
of social identities, there is a true distributive imbalance of freedom between the 
manipulated and the manipulator. Second, power holders can deliberately use this 
manipulative power in a particular direction. So, there is an element of intentional 
control which is very different from causing random effects. P is a strategic tool 
employed in imposing unfreedom upon subjects rather than a trivial by-product of 
C. Third, this power rests on the coercive capacity of the state. Manipulative power, 
P, is created by coercion in the narrow sense, C. Without enforcing a policy of 




For these reasons, it makes sense to hold that the manipulated individuals are 
indirectly coerced by state power. If the combination of these features could not 
count as an instance of indirect coercion or coercion in the broad sense of the term, 
then nothing would. Capacity deprivation, intentional control and original act of 
coercion (C) seem to be sufficient to call this phenomenon indirect coercion. 
Consequently, the CTP` would rule out this case because its second condition does 





 Through this paper, I argued that Bernard Williams’ realism suffers a tension 
between realist commitments and the epistemic requirements embedded in the 
CTP. Although the CTP is an epistemic criterion, it is still tasked with identifying 
instances of domination. Realism as a general approach does not tell us what degree 
of contextualization we should opt for. The task of identifying domination gives 
epistemic inquiry a properly contextualized scope. However, I argued that a 
violation of the CTP does not necessarily imply raw domination. The social identity 
theory in psychology indicates that minimal social categorization is sufficient to 
instigate the dynamics of intergroup behaviour which explains an important 
portion of ingroup favouritism and discrimination. I then showed how self-
justification of power via creation of social identities, which violates the CTP, might 
be possible without being coercive over those who accept the justification. This is 
because not every by-product of coercive power is coercive in both narrow and 
broad senses of the term “coercion”. Following this, I concluded that those who 
are influenced by non-coercive by-products are indeed not dominated by the state 
power. Hence, the violation of the CTP does not imply an order of state 
domination. Finally, I showed that it is still possible to revise the CTP in a way that 
is compatible with the basic tenets of realism. I do not claim that my revision is the 
only way to go about this task. However, my proposal serves the purpose in that it 
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